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**CONGRESS.**

**MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON THE REVENUE.**

Tuesday, Jan. 16.

Mr. Randolph asked the Speaker if the question were not on striking out of the resolution the words "and until an act shall be passed establishing a new tariff;" and on the Speaker answering in the affirmative—"so I thought," said Mr. R. "and yet I could not help doubting my understanding on the case. This is a limitation I have never before heard of. A law to remain in force, not to a particular time, but till a particular contingency shall have happened; till another law now in contemplation shall have passed. This, sir, is such a curiosity in legislation as I have not only never witnessed or heard of, but never so much as imagined; and as not only myself, but I do most potently believe, no man living, or that ever lived, did hear of. This question, sir, has been an old bone of contention between the two parties which divide this country, almost from the establishing of the constitution. It was always a principle obstinately maintained by the federalists, that the power of taxing extended beyond this house; and that taxes might be imposed permanently. While the opposite party as obstinately contended that the power of taxation, could not, constitutionally, be let out of the hands of the representatives—or in other words, that the makers of the constitution never intended to impart to the senate or the president, any right to impose taxes on the people. To every gentleman who knows the history of our government, and to every member who has been familiar with this house and its proceedings for any considerable length of time, it is well known to have been the constant subject of controversy, or, as I said before, a never failing bone of contention, as much so at least as any other subject—and the point being now thus voluntarily surrendered by the very men who had ranged themselves on the side of those who maintained the exclusive rights of this house to taxation, is to me a proof, additional to the many I have long had, that the time is come when the system of Mr. Jefferson, though it was the ladder by which the present administration mounted into power, is to be departed from both in practice and theory, in conduct of public affairs, and that the great principles which governed the policy of Mr. Jefferson, are to be entirely renounced. It is true all free governments—and it is still more true of that of the United States than of any other in the world, that the house in which the people are represented should never yield to any other, in the slightest extent, the power over the purse. This, sir, is a government of compromise, in the setting of which, we the great states stipulated, as the terms of that compromise, that the smallest of those states should be of equal weight with ourselves in the senate, and in the election of a president greater than in proportion to their strength—a fact the house should never lose sight of. Let the senate then do their duty—let them make those acts which by the constitution they are authorized to do, but let them not originate any money bills—never give that staff out of your own hands to be voted away by that body. I have infinitely less jealousy of the president—(I don't speak personally of him who now fills that office—I speak of the chief magistrate of the United States, whoever or whenever he may be)—than I have of the senate. It is in human nature, sir—not having lawfully the power to originate money bills, on money bills they will be most likely to make attempts to evince their power—like all other bodies they will be animated by the impulse of the *esprit du corps*, and will exercise it if you give them an opportunity.—The question is then, shall we give them that opportunity? We hear much said about taxes—and

about our funds being pledged to the public creditors—and about the national faith being violated with respect to those creditors if we should repeal the double taxes, oppressive as they are to the people.—To this I answer that the public faith never was broken when I had a share in the councils of the country—and yet we did repeal an entire system of taxation, though the whole of it was pledged for the public debt—and here, sir, we have another proof that the present government have renounced the true republican principles of Jefferson's administration, on which they raised themselves to power—and that they have taken up in their stead those of John Adams.—I mean we repealed that system of taxation—the federalists were against the repeal as these men are now, and, like these, insisted that the taxes were pledged to the public creditors. This, sir, is another plain indication that they have changed the principles by their pretences to which they have gulled the people, and that, as I have somewhere else remarked, their principles now is old federalism, vamped up into a something bearing the superficial appearance of republicanism.—Yes, we repealed those taxes upon the ground that so long as the nation should punctually pay the public creditor his due, the latter had no right to enquire out of what fund it came.—Suppose, sir, I borrow a sum of money and promise to pay my creditor out of the sales of my next crop of cotton, & that I should think fit to raise corn enough to pay him and chose to reserve my cotton in store for a more advantageous market—will any man be absurd enough to say that I violate the faith I had pledged to that creditor, if I did not sell my cotton? The federalists at that time said that we had violated the public faith—while we, on the other hand contended, that so long as the creditor was paid his just demand, he had no right to ask us where we got the means—whether we drew them like the federalists, from internal taxes—or like the republicans of that day, from our import duties, and the funds of the custom house. But, sir, Jefferson had other funds; funds of his own; funds out of the reach, as it should seem, of our present financiers—his WAYS and MEANS were the very reverse of theirs—his were economy—retrenchment: he put the country out of the reach of its creditors by retrenching the public expenditure to the amount of the debts to be paid.—By these ways and means the treasury overflowed with wealth, and a committee was appointed, not to raise double taxes or by a wholesale vote to continue in force those already; but to dispose of the surplus revenue that flowed into the treasury. Thus he was accustomed to have lying by, in the bank of the United States, from five to seven millions of dollars more than the disbursements, though he was all the time redeeming the public debt. That, sir, was the result of practising as well as preaching; that was the result of *really acting* upon the principles he *professed*; instead of professing one principle and practising another; professing republicanism and practising old federalism. Can the house pass a more severe sentence on Mr. Jefferson than in saying that the repeal of the internal taxes was a violation of the national faith? But let us go to the proof! At the time I allude to, the six per cent. stocks were above par; payments being made, too, in good hard dollars; not rags—but silver, or if you choose it, gold. What is the price now? You are at peace, and yet your stocks are at NINETY-EIGHT: and what is the value of the stuff you get for it; the rags? Why thirteen per cent. under par; so that you get just eighty-five out of each hundred of your stock. But then there was a pledge to the people; who, it seems, are in a state of pupillage, and want guardians: (Poor little things! I apprehend that in the administration of their affairs, the executorship is much better than the heirship)—a pledge to establish a sinking fund to redeem the debts incurred by the mismanagement of the executors. You promised that if the minor should elect you his guardian, you would pay off all the incumbrances on his estate. Did you do so? No; the ward was robbed, and his property was lavished away upon WAR-FEATS in Canada, and in tilts, and shows and tournaments.

My honourable colleague (Mr. Shefey) has said that the case of the manufacturers is not fairly before the house. It never can be fairly before the house. Whenever it comes before us it must come unfairly; not as "a spirit of health; but as a goblin damned—not bringing with it airs from heaven, but blasts from hell;" it ought to be ex-

ercised out of the house; for what do the principles about which such a contest is maintained amount to, but a system of bounties to manufacturers, in order to encourage them to do that which, if it be advantageous to do at all, they will do of course, for their own sakes—a largess to men to exercise their own customary callings, for their own emoluments; and government devising plans and bestowing premiums out of the pockets of the hard working cultivators of the soil to mould the productive labor of the country into a thousand fantastic shapes, barring up, all the time, for that perverted purpose, the great, deep, rich stream of our prosperous industry. Such a case, sir, I agree with the honourable gentleman, cannot be fairly brought before the house. It eventuates in this, whether you, a planter, will consent to be taxed, in order to hire another man to go to work in a shoe-maker's shop, or to set up a Spinning Jenny. For my part I will not agree to it, even though they should, by way of return, agree to be taxed to help us to plant tobacco; much less will I agree to pay all and receive nothing for it. No, I'll buy where I can get manufactures cheapest; I will not agree to lay a duty on the cultivators of the soil to encourage exotic manufacture; because, after all, we should only get much worse things at a much higher price, and we, the cultivators of the country, would, in the end, pay for all. Why do not gentlemen ask us to grant a bounty for the encouragement of making flour? the reason is too plain for me to repeat it; then why pay a man much more than the value of it, to work up our own cotton into clothing, when by selling my raw material, I can get my clothing much better and cheaper from Dacca.

Sir, I am convinced it would be impolitic as well as unjust, to aggravate the burthens of the people, for the purpose of favoring the manufacturers, for, this government created and gave power to Congress, to regulate commerce and equalize duties on the whole of the United States, and not to lay a duty but with a steady eye to revenue. With my good will, sir, there should be none but an *ad valorem* duty on all articles, which would prevent the possibility of one interest in the country being sacrificed by the management of taxation, to another. What is there in those objects of the honorable gentleman's solicitude, to give them a claim to be supported by the earnings of the others. The agriculturalists bear the whole brunt of the war and taxation, and remain poor, while the others run in the ring of pleasure, and fatten upon them. The agriculturalists not only pay all, but fight all, while the others run. The manufacturer is the citizen of no place or any place; the agriculturalist has his property, his lands, his all, his household goods to defend; and like that meek drudge, the Ox, who does the labor and ploughs the ground, and then, for his reward, takes the refuse of the farm yard—the blighted blades and the moulded straw, and the mildewed shocks of corn for his support. While the commercial speculators live in opulence, whirling in coaches, and indulging in palaces, to use the words of Dr. Johnson, coaches which fly like meteors and palaces which rise like exhalations. Even without your aid, though agriculturalists are no match for them. Alert, vigilant, enterprising and active, the manufacturing interests are collected in masses, and ready to associate, at a moment's warning, for any purpose of general interest to their body. Do but ring the fire bell, and you can assemble all the manufacturing interest of Philadelphia in fifteen minutes—Nay, for matter of that, they are always assembled; they are always on the *rialto*—And *Shylock* and *Antonio* meet there every day as friends, and compare notes, and lay plans, and possess in trick and intelligence what, in the goodness of God to them, the others can never possess.—It is the choicest bounty to the ox, that he cannot play the fox or the tyger.—So it is to one of the body of agriculturalists, that he cannot skip into a coffee-house, and shave a note with one hand, while with the other he signs a petition to Congress, portraying the wrongs and grievances, and sufferings he endures, and begging them to relieve him—yes, to relieve him out of the pockets of those whose labours have fed and enriched, and whose valour has defended him. The cultivators; the patient drudges of the other orders of society, are now waiting for your resolution. For on you it depends, whether they shall be left further unhurt, or be like those in Europe reduced *gratis*, and subjected to another squeeze from the hard grasp of power. Sir! I have done.

RUFUS KING has been nominated by the federalists for Governor of N. York.

**INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT.**

IN SENATE—Tuesday, Feb. 6.  
 The committee appointed on so much of the President's message, as relate to roads and canals.

REPORT—  
 That a view of the extent of territory, the number and magnitude of navigable lakes, rivers and bays; the variety of climate, and consequent diversity of productions embraced by the United States, cannot fail to impose the conviction, that a capacity exists in this country to maintain an extensive internal commerce.—The variety of productions peculiar to the several parts, invites to the prosecution of a commerce of the most interesting kind. A commerce internal, subject solely to the regulations of the country, not dependent on, or materially affected by, the vicissitudes of foreign competition, or collisions; the profits on which will rest in the country, and make an addition to the wealth of the nation. Such a commerce will in its natural tendency, create interests and feelings, consonant with the great interests of the community. Any practicable scheme, therefore, for the improvement of roads and inland navigation having for its object the encouragement and extension of a commerce so beneficial, has strong claims to the attention and aid of a government, constituted to promote the general welfare.

Such improvements executed on an extensive scale, would unquestionably contribute to the general interest, and increase of wealth in the nation; for whatever tends to accelerate the progress of industry, in its various and particular branches, or to remove the obstacles to its full exertion, must, in the result, produce that effect. The contemplated improvement in roads and canals, by extending the communication for commercial and personal intercourse to the interior and distant parts of the Union, would bestow common benefits, and give an enlarged facility to the great branches of national industry, whether agricultural, commercial or manufacturing.

The agricultural products, which at present from inconvenient distance, their weight, or bulk, are unportable, could then be carried to a distant market; the reduction on the charge for price enhance the value of the lands from which the products were drawn.

The general commerce of the country would thereby receive a proportional advantage from the increase of the quantity of articles for exportation, the facility and extension to the vending of imported commodities, as also from a more general consumption, arising from an increased ability in the community to purchase such commodities. To manufacturers a reduction on the charge for transportation of the raw material, and wrought commodity, would be highly beneficial.—The beneficial effects on individual interests, and the general wealth in society, arising from a system of cheap conveyance, by artificial roads and canals, does not rest on speculative opinion, or abstract reasonings, for confirmation; all doubts, as to the advantages, have been removed by the test of experience in every country where such improvements have been executed on a liberal scale.

To insure the pursuits of useful industry in a nation a state of the greatest prosperity, it is only necessary to protect their interests from foreign aggression, to leave them unrestrained by artificial provisions, and to remove, or meliorate, the natural obstacles to their exertions, by public works rendering conveyance practicable and cheap.

Such public works, while they are calculated to subserve the pecuniary interests of every industrious class of the community, are highly important in a political point of view. The citizens, in the most remote parts, would be brought into close connection by a facility to commercial and personal intercourse. The common interests and identity of feelings then arising, would, as cement to the parts, bind together the whole, with the strong bond of interest and affection, giving stability and perpetuity to the union.—And as means of security, tend to increase our capacity for resistance to foreign aggressions by rendering less expensive, and more effective, our military operations. The disadvantages experienced, and heavy charges incurred during the late war, for want of inland navigation along the sea-coast, connecting the great points of defence, are of too recent date, and decisive a character, to require any other demonstration, that a facility in inland communication, constitutes a principal means of national defence.

It is believed that improvements so

important to the political and general interest of society, stand strongly recommended to the attention of the national legislature. The general government alone, possess the means and resources to give a direction to works calculated for general advantage and to insure their complete execution.

The particular objects of this kind, to which public aid should be given, the means to be employed, and the mode of applying the public monies, remains to be considered.

The objects are such artificial roads and canals as are practicable of execution; and which promises a general or extensive advantage to the community; others of minor importance, that are local in their nature, and will produce only local benefits will more properly be left for execution, to the means and enterprise of individuals, or the exertions of particular States.—It is, indeed, a political maxim, well attested by experience, that whatever private interests are competent to the provision and application of their own instruments and means, such provision and means could be left to themselves.

The great works which are calculated for national advantage either in a military or commercial view, their execution must depend (at least for aid) on the general government. Wherever great obstacles are to be overcome, great power and means must be employed. To such works the means of associated individuals are incompetent, and the particular States may not have a sufficient interest in the execution of works of the most essential advantage to other parts of the community. In other cases, where interest might be sufficiently operative, the means or the power may not be possessed, their territorial jurisdiction being limited short of the whole extent of the work.

Among many other objects of improvement in inland navigation and roads, coming within the above description, the following appears to be recommended by their importance to the attention of congress: 1st. Canals opening an inland navigation along the Atlantic sea-coast. 2d. A great turnpike road from north to south. 3d. Turnpike roads forming communications between the Atlantic and western rivers. 4th. Military roads communicating with the frontier posts; and, 5th. A canal around the falls of Ohio, or opening the bed of the river at that place.

The present state of the national finances, and the effect which engaging in many expensive works at the same time would produce, in raising the price of labor, seems to point out the policy of applying the public means to one, or only a few of these objects, in the first instance.

The difficulty and delicacy of selecting a particular object from among many others of acknowledged importance and great interest, is sensibly felt. In making the decision, general interest must be kept in view, and be held superior to local considerations. It appears proper, that when the government authorize the expenditure and application of public monies, to one of these objects, they should at the same time adopt a system, calculated to insure, in due time, the execution of other works requiring their aid.

After due consideration, and that examination which the committee have been able to give to the subject, they respectfully recommend to the first attention of congress, "The Chesapeake and Delaware Canals," being in their opinion of the first importance, and requiring the aid of the general government. It forms the central link, in that great chain of inland navigation along the sea-coast proposed to be opened. It is believed from the best evidence to be practicable of execution, and of itself, unconnected with other improvements, will afford the most extensive advantages. On this the committee will make a special report.

Of the different modes which might be devised of applying public monies to objects of internal improvements; that of authorising subscriptions for a limited number of shares of the stock of companies incorporated for the purpose, appears, on every consideration, to be most eligible. By limiting the number of shares to be subscribed, to a third, or less than one half, of the whole stock, there is more security that the government shall not become engaged in impracticable projects for improvements, and also for the economical expenditure of the funds, than would be, on the plan of a direct application, by government of the public monies.

The committee, in order to ascertain what funds may be made applicable to the objects of internal improvement, with due regard to the state of the